DNS Privacy EDU Tutorial

dnsprivacy.org

Sara Dickinson <u>Sinodun</u> sara@sinodun.com

Overview


- The problem: Why Internet privacy and DNS Privacy are important (DNS leakage)
- Recent Progress: Chart progress during last 3-4 years (DPRIVE)
- Where are we now? Present current status and tools

Internet Privacy

Slides from: Daniel Kahn Gillmor (ACLU)


Why does internet privacy matter?

- Surveillance as social control
- Machine learning at scale today means small number of people controlling network can perform mass surveillance



Behaviour changes


(even when no-one is watching)



Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook's Spiral of Silence Effects in the Wake of NSA Internet Monitoring

Elizabeth Stoycheff, Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 1-16

DNS is part of the leaky boat problem



DNS Privacy - A brief history

IETF Privacy activity

March 2011 I-D: Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols (IAB) Snowdon What timing! **June 2013** revelations **RFC6973**: Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols **July 2013 RFC7258**: Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack: "PM is an attack on the privacy of Internet users May 2014 and organisations."

RFC 7258

"PM is an attack on the privacy of Internet users and organisations."

"...that needs to be **mitigated** where possible, **via the design of protocols** that make PM significantly more expensive or infeasible."


DNS Privacy in 2013?




- DNS is 30 year old! [RFC1034/5 (1987)]
 - Original design availability, redundancy and speed!
 - DNS is an 'enabler'
- DNS standards:
 - UDP (99% of traffic to root)

DNS sent in clear text -> NSA: 'MORECOWBELL'

- TCP only for 'fallback' (pre 2010)
- Perception: The DNS is public, right? It is not sensitive/personal information....it doesn't need to be protected/encrypted





EDNS0 problem

• **RFC6891**: Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)

Intended to enhance DNS protocol capabilities

 But.... mechanism enabled addition of end-user data into DNS queries (non-standard options)

EDNS0 problem

• RFC6891: Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)


Intended to enhance DNS protocol capabilities

 But... mechanism enabled addition of end-user data into DNS queries (non-standard options)

ISP justification: Parental Filtering (per user)

CDN justification: Faster content (geo location)


Parental Filtering



[User src address]

MAC address or id

in DNS query





[User src address]


MAC address or id

in DNS query

Client Subnet (<u>RFC7871</u>) contains source subnet **in** DNS query







DNS: It's not just for names


Almost every activity starts with a DNS query (try it)!

- MX records (email domain)
- SRV records (services)
- OPENPGPKEY (email addresses)
- ...this is only going to increase....


DNS: It's not just for names

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- (AUTH) Who monitors or has access here ISP/ government/NSA/Passive DNS?
- (AUTH) Does my ISP sell my (anonymous) data?
- (UNAUTH) How safe is this data?



- When at home...
- When in a coffee shop…



Root

- (AUTH) Who monitors or has access here ISP/ government/NSA/Passive DNS?
- (AUTH) Does my ISP sell my (anonymous) data?
- (UNAUTH) How safe is this data?

Who monitors or has access here?





- When at home...
- When in a coffee shop…

Auth for .org

Who monitors or has access here?

DNS - leakage

- Basic problem is leakage of meta data
 - Allows fingerprinting and re-identification of individuals
- Even without user meta data traffic analysis is possible based just on timings and cache snooping
- Operators see (and log) your DNS queries

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DNS Risk Matrix

	In-Flight		At F	Rest
Risk	Stub => Rec	Rec => Auth	At Recursive	At Authoritative
Passive Monitoring				
Active Monitoring				
Other Disclosure				

Risks

e.g. Data

breaches

DNS Privacy options (2013)

DNSCurve

Recursive-Auth

- Daniel J. Bernstein, initial interest but not adoption
- DNSCrypt

Stub-Recursive

 Several clients and open DNSCrypt Resolvers (OpenDNS), [Yandex browser]

Anti-spoofing, anti DoS

- (2014) <u>Unbound</u> did DNS-over-TLS for <u>DNSSEC-Trigger</u>
- Goals were for authentication/DNSSEC with some privacy, documented but not standard

DPRIVE WG et al.



DPRIVE WG


DPRIVE WG create in 2014

<u>Charter</u>: Primary Focus is Stub to recursive

- Why not tackle whole problem?
 - Don't boil the ocean, stepwise solution
 - Stub to Rec reveals most information
 - Rec to Auth is a particularly hard problem



DNS Privacy problem



Problem statement: RFC 7626

DNS Privacy Considerations:

Expert coverage of risks throughout DNS ecosystem

- Rebuts "alleged public nature of DNS data"
 - The data may be public, but a DNS 'transaction' is not/should not be.

"A typical example from outside the DNS world is: the web site of Alcoholics Anonymous is public; the fact that you visit it should not be."

Stub/Rec Encryption Options

	Pros	Cons	
STARTTLS	 Port 53 Known technique Incrementation deployment 	 Downgrade attack on negotiation Port 53 - middleboxes blocking? Latency from negotiation 	
TLS (new port)	 New DNS port (no interference with port 53) Existing implementations 	New port assignmentScalability?	
DTLS (new port)	UDP basedNot as widely used/ deployed	 Truncation of DNS messages (just like UDP)	

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Encrypted DNS 'TODO' list

- 1. Get a new port
- 2. DNS-over-TCP/TLS: Address issues in standards and implementations
- 3. Tackle authentication of DNS servers (bootstrap problem)
- 4. What about <u>traffic analysis</u> of encrypted traffic msg size & timing still tell a lot!

1. Get a new port!

- One does not simply get a new port...
- Oct 2015 **853** is the magic number

Your request has been processed. We have assigned the following system port number as an early allocations per RFC7120, with the DPRIVE Chairs as the point of contact:

```
domain-s 853 tcp DNS query-response protocol run over TLS/DTLS domain-s 853 udp DNS query-response protocol run over TLS/DTLS
```

2. DNS + TCP/TLS?


- DNS-over-TCP history:
 - Typical DNS clients do 'one-shot' TCP
 - Performance tools based on one-shot TCP
 - DNS servers have very basic TCP capabilities
 - No attention paid to TCP tuning, robustness

2. Fix DNS-over-TCP/TLS

Goal	How?		
Optimise set up & resumption	RFC7413: TFO Fast Open RFC5077: TLS session resumption TLS 1.3 (0-RTT)		
Amortise cost of TCP/TLS setup	RFC7766 (bis of RFC5966) - March 2016: Client pipelining (not one-shot!), Server concurrent processing, Out-of-order responses RFC7828: Persistent connections (Keepalive)		
Servers handle many connections robustly			

Performance (RFC7766)

AIM: Performance on a par with UDP



2 Usage Profiles:

- Strict
 - "Do or do not. There is no try."
- Opportunistic
 - "Success is stumbling from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm"

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Try in order:

- 1. Encrypt & Authenticate then
- 2. Encrypt then
- 3. Clear text

- Authentication based on config of either:
 - Authentication domain name (easier)
 - SPKI pinset (harder)
- Shouldn't DNS use DANE...? Well even better:
 - I-D: TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension

DNS Privacy client [DNSSEC]

DNS Privacy server

1: Obtain a Auth Domain name & IP address

(1a)

- Configure Auth domain name
- Do Opportunistic A lookup

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- Opportunistic lookup of DANE records for server
- Validate locally with DNSSEC

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Client Hello: TLS DNSSEC Chain Ext

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Reduces Latency

• Eliminates need for intermediate recursive


DPRIVE Solution Documents (stub to recursive)

Document	Date	Topic	
<u>RFC7858</u>	May 2016	DNS-over-TLS	
<u>RFC7830</u>	May 2016	4. EDNS0 Padding Option	
<u>RFC8094</u>	Feb 2017	DNS-over-DTLS	
draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and- tls-profiles	IESG LC	Authentication for DNS-over-(D)TLS	

^{*}Category: Experimental


What about Recursive to Authoritative?

- I-D: Next step for DPRIVE: resolver-to-auth link
 - Presents 6 authentication options
- DPRIVE Re-charter...
- Data on DNS-over-(D)TLS




Other work....

DNS Disclosure Example 1



RFC7816: QNAME Minimisation



DNS-over-HTTP(S)

Avoids e.g. port 853 blocking

- Google: <u>DNS-over-HTTPS</u> (non-standard)
- Standards are in flux (many drafts....)
 - DNS wire-format over HTTP (tunnelling)

Implementations exist

DNS over HTTPS (query origination)

Mix HTTPS/2 and DNS on one connection

DNS-over-QUIC

- DNS over dedicated QUIC connections
 - QUIC is a developing open source protocol (from Google) that runs over UDP (HTTPS/2-like)
 - ~35% of Google's egress traffic (~7% of Internet traffic)
 - Reliable, low latency, performant
 - Source address validation, no MTU limit
 - Encrypted

DNS Data handling



- Do you read the small print of your ISPs contract?
- More work/research needed in this area
 - Monitoring of government policy and practice
 - Transparency from providers on policy and breaches
 - Methods for de-identification of user data (e.g. DITL)
 - 'PassiveDNS' data used for research/security

DNS Data handling



- Do you read the small print of your ISPs contract?
- More wo
 - Monit
 - Trans
 - Method

Not always a technical solution: Needs more work

ctice

nd breaches

a (e.g. DITL)

'PassiveDNS' data used for research/security



Risk Mitigation Matrix

	In-Flight		At Rest	
Risk	Stub => Rec	Rec => Auth	At Recursive	At Authoritative
Passive monitoring	Encryption (e.g. TLS, HTTPS)	QNAME		
Active monitoring	Authentication & Encryption	Minimization		
Other Disclosure Risks e.g. Data breaches			Data Best Practices (Policies) e.g. De-identification	

DNS Service Discovery

DNS Service Discovery

- Devices advertise services on network (DNS, mDNS) - leakage can be global
- Other devices then discover the service and use it

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```
Alice's Images . _imageStore._tcp . local Alice's Mobile Phone . _presence._tcp . local Alice's Notebook . _presence._tcp . local
```

DNS-SD Privacy

- Advertising leaks information about:
 - User 'name', devices, services (user tracking)
 - Devices services & attributes (port, priorities)
 - Device fingerprinting possible
 - => Software or specific device identification
- Discovery leaks info about preferred services

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Discovery leaks info about preferred services

DNS Privacy Implementation Status

dnsprivacy.org



- DNS Privacy Project homepage
- Who? Sinodun, NLnet Labs, Salesforce, ... (plus various grants and individual contributions)
- What? Point of reference for DNS Privacy services
 - Quick start guides for operators & end users
 - Ongoing work presentations, IETF, Hackathons
 - Tracking of DNS-over-TLS experimental servers

Recursive implementations

Features		Recursive resolver			
		Knot Res	Unbound	BIND	
TCP/TLS Features	TCP fast open				
	Process pipelined queries				
	Provide OOOR				
	EDNS0 Keepalive				
TLS Features	TLS on port 853				
	Provide server certificate				
	EDNS0 Padding				
Rec => Auth	QNAME Minimisation				

Dark Green: Latest stable release supports this

Light Green: Patch available

Yellow: Patch/work in progress, or requires building a patched dependency

Purple: Workaround available

Grey: Not applicable or not yet planned

Alternative server side solutions

- Pure TLS load balancer
 - NGINX, HAProxy
 - BIND article on using stunnel

Disadvantages

- DNS specific access control is missing
- pass through of edns0-tcp-keepalive option
- <u>dnsdist</u> from PowerDNS would be great...
 - But no support yet but requested: #3980



Stub implementations

Features		Stub				
		getdns (stubby)	kdig	BIND (dig)	ldns	
TCP/TLS Features	TCP fast open					
	Connection reuse					
	Pipelining of queries					
	Process OOOR					
	EDNS0 Keepalive					
	TLS on port 853					
TLS Features	Authentication of server					
	EDNS0 Padding					

Dark Green: Latest stable release supports this Light Green: Patch available

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Implementation Status Summary

- Increasing uptake of better DNS-over-TCP, QNAME minimisation
- Several implementations of DNS-over-TLS
- None yet of DNS-over-DTLS
- BII has <u>DNS-over-HTTP implementation</u>

DNS Privacy Deployment Status

DNS-over-TLS Servers

Hosted by	Notes		
NLnet Labs	Unbound		
Surfnet (Sinodun)	BIND + HAProxy BIND + nginx		
UncensoredDNS	Unbound		
dns.cmrg.net	Knot Resolver		

12 at last count - find details at: <u>DNS Test Servers</u>

Server monitoring

Project dnsprivacy-monitoring

- * Green indicates success
- * Red indicates failed test (this might result from non DNS related issues such server being off line, blocking from the probe location, etc.) Note that the 'Strict mode' tests could fail for a number of reasons including incorrect credentials, self-signed certificates for name only authentication, incompatible TLS version or Cipher suites, etc. The console log of the test may give more information.
- * Grey indicates test not run (e.g. due to lack of available transport or the lack of the SPKI pin)

Authentication information is taken from https://dnsprivacy.org/wiki/display/DP/DNS+Privacy+Test+Servers
These tests use Stephane Bortzmeyer's nagios plugin - see https://github.com/bortzmeyer/monitor-dns-over-tls

Configuration Matrix		Responds over TLS	Strict mode - Name only	Strict mode - SPKI only	Certificate expiry > 0 days	Certificate expiry > 14 days	QNAME minimisation used
getdnsapi.net	v6	②	②	②	O	②	O
	v4	②	②	②	O	②	②
dnsovertls.sinodun.com	v6	②	②	②	O	O	0
	v4	②	②	②	②	O	0
dnsovertls1.sinodun.con	v6	②	②	②	O	②	0
	v4	②	②	②	②	②	0
dns.cmrg.net	v6	②	②	②	②	②	②
	v4	②	②	②	②	②	0
tls-dns-u.odvr.dns-	v6	②	0	0	②	②	0
oarc.net	v4	②	0	0	②	②	0
dns-resolver.yeti.eu.org	v6	②	②	②	②	②	②
yeti-rr.datev.net	v6	②	②	②	O	0	②
	v4						
unicast.censurfridns.dk	v6	②	②		②	②	0
	v4	②	②		②	②	0
dns-tls.openbsd.se	v6						
		O	O	O	O	O	0



Server monitoring


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IETF NOC is running 2 experimental DNS-over-TLS servers at IETF 99!

Check to meeting network information page!




Stubby



- A privacy enabling stub resolver: <u>User Guide</u>
- Available in <u>getdns</u> (1.1.1 release)
 - Run as daemon handling requests
 - Configure OS DNS resolution to point at localhost
 - DNS queries then proxied over TLS
 - Comes with config for experimental servers


Stubby Status

- Command tool still prototype for 'advanced' users
 - Supports name and SPKI pinset authentication
 - Strict and Opportunistic profiles
- · Being split out as a separate application.... (WIP)
- Homebrew formula, docker image and macOS UI on the way.....



SubbyUl preview

Validate Config




```
resolution type: GETDNS RESOLUTION STUB
 dns transport list: [ GETDNS TRANSPORT TLS ]
 tls authentication: GETDNS_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED
 tls query padding blocksize: 256
 edns client subnet private : 1
 listen addresses: [ 127.0.0.1, 0::1 ]
 idle timeout: 10000
 round robin upstreams: 1
, upstream recursive servers:
     address data: 145.100.185.15
     tls auth name: "dnsovertls.sinodun.com"
    , tls pubkey pinset:
      [ { digest: "sha256"
         value: 621Ku9HsDVbyiPenApnc4sfmSYTHOVfFqL3pyB+cBL4=
     address data: 145.100.185.16
    , tls auth name: "dnsovertls1.sinodun.com"
    , tls pubkey pinset:
      [ { digest: "sha256"
         value: cE2ecALeE5B+urJhDrJlVFmf38cJLAvqekONvjvpqUA=
```

OK

Cancel

SubbyUI preview



```
resolution type: GETDNS RESOLUTION STUB
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 Validate Config
                                                          OK
                                             Cancel
```

Stubby Log

```
[14:27:20.240720] 510881: 143.100.103.10
                                                                          : IIdhaport-Iba - Froille-atrict
[14:27:26.243898] STUBBY: 185.49.141.37
                                                         : Conn init
                                                                         : Transport=TLS - Profile=Strict
[14:27:26.244161] STUBBY: 2001:610:1:40ba:145:100:185:15 : Conn init
                                                                         : Transport=TLS - Profile=Strict
[14:27:26.244406] STUBBY: 2001:610:1:40ba:145:100:185:16 : Conn init
                                                                         : Transport=TLS - Profile=Strict
[14:27:26.244740] STUBBY: 2a04:b900:0:100::37
                                                         : Conn init
                                                                         : Transport=TLS - Profile=Strict
[14:27:37.224439] STUBBY: 2a01:3a0:53:53::
                                                         : Conn closed : Transport=TLS - Resps=7 , Timeouts=

    Curr auth=Success, Keepalive(ms)=10000

[14:27:37.224532] STUBBY: 2a01:3a0:53:53::
                                                         : Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Resps=7 , Timeouts=
                                                                                                                 0, Best auth=Success
[14:27:37.224552] STUBBY: 2a01:3a0:53:53::
                                                         : Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Conns=1 , Conn fails= 0, Conn shutdowns= 0, Backoffs=0
                                                                                                                 Curr Auth=Success, Keepalive(ms)=10000
[14:27:37.224906] STUBBY: 89.233.43.71
                                                         : Conn closed : Transport=TLS - Resps=7 , Timeouts=
[14:27:37.224937] STUBBY: 89.233.43.71
                                                         : Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Resps=7 , Timeouts=
                                                                                                                 Best auth=Success
[14:27:37.224951] STUBBY: 89.233.43.71
                                                         : Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Conns=1 , Conn fails= 0, Conn shutdowns= 0, Backoffs=0
[14:27:37.225137] STUBBY: 145.100.185.15
                                                         : Conn closed : Transport=TLS - Resps=8 , Timeouts=

    Curr auth=Success, Keepalive(ms)=10000

[14:27:37.225170] STUBBY: 145.100.185.15
                                                         : Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Resps=8 , Timeouts=
                                                                                                                 Best auth=Success
```

Hackathon news...

- More work on Stubby packaging and UI
- Implementation started on Dane Authentication in getdns and Unbound
- Android support for Opportunistic DNS-over-TLS is a work in progress

DNS Privacy Usability

- DNS Privacy is a new paradigm for end users
- End users are a new paradigm for DNS people!
- 'Usable Security': Good GUIs aren't enough users still struggle with the basics if they don't understand what they are doing (HTTPS, PGP, DNSSEC)
- DNS Privacy uptake critically dependant on clients being usable + successful

Key challenges

- 1. Awareness!
- 2. Clients: OS integration of (more) client solutions
- 3. Usable client solutions for non-technical users
- 4. Increased deployment (anycast deployments)
- 5. Operator transparency in DNS data handling
- 6. Recursive to Authoritative....



Summary

- DNS Privacy is a real problem and more relevant than ever
- Active work on the large solution space
- Can use DNS Privacy today using Stubby & current experimental recursive servers
- More DNS Privacy services on the way...

Thank you!

Any Questions?

dnsprivacy.org